by Alexander Daniels, Yale University
The rise of regional trade agreements throughout the world has sparked debate between defenders and opponents of liberalized, free trade. It has become common rhetoric among anti-trade activists to denounce the environmental effects of such trade agreements. At the same time, free trade proponents often inflate the potential benefits of a liberalized market.
This paper argues that while regional trade liberalization does not necessarily create “pollution havens†for multinational corporations, it is of utmost importance to integrate strict qualifications that provide for environmental welfare into any regional trade agreement.
With ten years having passed from the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it is clear that Mexican environmental regulation has improved and that numerous forces have been at work to prevent a “race to the bottom phenomenon.
The rise of regional trade agreements throughout the world has sparked debate between defenders and opponents of liberalized, free trade. A significant part of the debate has hovered around the “race to the bottom†phenomenon, one in which multinational corporations are driven to produce their most pollution-intensive products in developing countries with low and unregulated environmental standards. The environmental lobby has come to invoke this anti-trade argument without challenge to its validity. In a warning call to the world, Ralph Nader outlined his belief that “[Large global companies] hope to use GATT and NAFTA to capitalize on the poverty of Third World countries and exploit their generally low environmental, safety, and wage standards.†[1] Nader explains that “The attraction [to U.S. companies] is simple: a workforce that earns as little as four to five dollars a day… and environmental and workplace standards are either lax or largely unenforced.†[2] Naderâ€TMs argument is part of a broad assumption underlying opposition to world trade liberalization. In the words of another activist, “[Multinational corporations] are using trade rules to advance narrow commercial interests by challenging societyâ€TMs efforts to protect the environment…†[3] As it stands today, the “race to the bottom†phenomenon is an accepted argument among anti-trade environmentalists. I argue, however, that the phenomenon is not as simple as Ralph Nader and other activists suggest. Using the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a template, I will show that multinational and regional trade agreements do not necessarily create a “pollution haven†for firms and can, in fact, both increase and strengthen environmental regulation and performance in all participating countries.
On December 17, 1992, [4] George H. Bush signed an agreement that would put NAFTA into effect on January 1, 1994. This agreement was created, among other reasons, in order to “reduce distortions to trade,†to enhance the competitiveness of the participant countriesâ€TM firms in global markets, to “create new employment opportunities,†and to “improve working conditions and living standards in their respective territories.†[5] Prior to the two-year negotiations over NAFTA, trade and environmental policy making had been considered to be entirely separate realms [6]. In fact, no mention was made of the word “environment†in the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor to todayâ€TMs World Trade Organization [7]. Negotiations over NAFTA, most hotly debated in 1991 and 1992, created a certain “clash of cultures†between environmentalists and free trade supporters, two groups that had never previously come into much contact [8]. To explain this clash of cultures, Daniel Esty writes that “the trade community pursues a holy grail of higher incomes through expanded trade [while] the environmental world traditionally has feared that economic development is a false deity, and that monetary prosperity will be achieved only at a price of ecological degradation.†[9] Resolving the never-before-encountered differences between the two schools of thought seemed to be at the crux of the NAFTA debate.
There were four main arguments that the environmental lobby sprung against the free-traders [10]. The first, and most publicly prominent, was that of the maquiladorazone in Mexico. This duty-free zone, extending 100 kilometers to the south of the U.S.-Mexico border, was created by the Border Industrialization Plan of 1965 to “provide incentives for direct foreign investment, especially by U.S. companies.†[11] It has been generated by trade across the borders and, before the 1990s, was largely governed by unregulated labor and environmental laws. In a testimony on the maquiladorazone to two House Subcommittees in 1990, the National Wildlife Federation made reference to 25 million gallons of raw sewage flowing daily into the Rio Grande, high levels of hard metals in ground water, and high incidences of Hepatitis A in the local populations [12]. Additionally, these intense pollution problems created cross-border environmental problems in Arizona and Texas [13], so this was clearly not only a Mexican issue. NAFTA, the argument went, would only encourage greater industrial activity, thus straining environmental infrastructure in Mexico [14] and worsening border environmental conditions in an already unregulated area.
The second main argument raised by the environmental lobby was that of a “race to the bottom†by industrial firms — polluting Mexican plants with a comparative advantage in production would sell goods more cheaply than clean United States plants, causing factories from the United States to relocate to Mexico. This idea was made famous by Ross Perotâ€TMs remark in a 1993 Presidential Debate that lax environmental standards in Mexico would create a “giant sucking sound†[15] of industry leaving North America to take advantage of the lower costs of production. Chapter 11 of NAFTAâ€TMs text addresses the “race to the bottom†issue by deeming it “inappropriate to encourage or seek to retain investment by relaxing environmental standards or enforcement.†[16] In the eyes of the environmental lobby, however, this provision is simply a request that has no mode of enforcement. NAFTA, in other words, has no means to deal with this type of situation other than to conduct “consultations†of the alleged offending partiesâ€TM practice. This mechanism, to environmentalists, was inadequate.
The third argument surrounding the environmental debate over NAFTA involved the possible reduction of U.S. and Canadian environmental standards in order to increase their firmsâ€TM competitiveness with Mexican plants. There was a precedent set for this argument in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989. Under this agreement, Canada challenged a lower U.S. asbestos regulation standard, a challenge that eventually led to an incremental lowering of Canadian standards for the same [17]. It has been pointed out, however, that “governments rarely lower their environmental standards overtly to improve their competitive position. They do, however, relax the enforcement of their standards or fail to raise standards to optimal levels for fear of exposing their industries to higher costs than their competitors.†[18] Additionally, nontariff trade barriers are considered to be illegal under NAFTA law. It was argued (most publicly by Ralph Nader) that NAFTA mechanisms would be used in order to overturn United States environmental standards that could be characterized as nontariff trade barriers [19].
Finally, there was great concern over the quasi-nonexistent enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico. Although Mexico had developed a strong legal framework for protecting the environment under President Carlos Salinas [20], only 6% of the maquiladorafactories complied with operating license requirements before 1990 [21]. In 1989, the sole Mexican federal environmental enforcement and policy agency, La Secretaria de Desarollo Urbano y EcologÃa (SEDUE), only had 81 employees in inspection and enforcement and a budget of $4.3 million [22]. The Environmental Protection Agency, by comparison, employs almost 5,000 regulators [23] and had a $7 billion budget throughout the 1990s [24]. The environmental lobby argued that if NAFTA were to be ratified, it had an obligation to increase Mexicoâ€TMs environmental regulatory power.
In the face of these compelling arguments was a trade agreement that the EPA administrator, William Reilly, called “the greenest trade agreement ever.†[25] This statement was supported by two major innovations in NAFTA negotiations. The first innovation was procedural in that new institutions were created for the purpose of upholding and maintaining compliance with NAFTA regulations. The second innovation was substantive, in the form of the words in the final Agreement that was signed into law.
The first major procedural action to come out of environmental negotiations over NAFTA was the creation of the Integrated Border Environmental Plan by the Bush and Salinas administrations in 1991 and early 1992 [26]. This program funneled $589 million over two years to the creation and improvement of infrastructurally related environmental problems, especially those associated with a lack of wastewater treatment plants [27]. More importantly, however, was the shift in long-term thoughts and attitudes that could be detected in the formation of the Border Plan. Debate over the draft border plan drew standing-room only crowds at public hearings along the U.S.-Mexico border in 1991. [28]. Additionally, the Plan catalogued, for the first time, “the spectrum of environmental concerns†arising along the 2,000 mile long maquiladorazone [29]. This type of transparency by the Mexican government and participation by the Mexican public were unprecedented [30]. The Border Plan was the first administrative manifestation of widely growing views that trade policy and environmental problems should be considered hand-in-hand. Critics, however, answered by saying the Border Plan was only short term funding for a solution to a problem that could last for decades after NAFTA goes into effect. In 1992, the Presidency was turned over to Bill Clinton, a candidate who had promised during his presidential campaign to implement the suggested “parallel track negotiations†between trade policy and environmental policy. This promise led to the creation of what was called an “Environmental Side Agreement†to NAFTA, the first such provision in a trade agreement [31]. The Side Agreement created the North American Development Bank, set up in order “to promote environmental infrastructure investments†along the U.S.-Mexico border [32], and it created the Border Environment Cooperation Commission, set up in order to foster transparent communication between the public and the officials and to ensure continued environmental enforcement under NAFTA law [33]. These procedural advancements, however, were not the only forces present to allay the environmentalistsâ€TM fears.
The first substantive advancements in NAFTA began on the opening page of the treaty. Three of the fifteen basic goals of the agreement, as outlined in the Preamble, directly affect the environment — promoting sustainable development, strengthening “the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations,†and undertaking “each of the goals in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation.†[34] These are three imperatives that never would have appeared anywhere, let alone in the Preamble, in a major multilateral trade agreement prior to the 1992 U.N. Conference on the Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro. A second substantive advancement assured that priority would be given to international environmental treaties on endangered species (CITES), the ozone layer (Montreal Protocol), and hazardous wastes (Basel Convention) in the case of any inconsistency between the environmental treaty and NAFTA [35]. A third advancement establishes the rights of countries to exceed international environmental standards [36]. This was important because, to free traders, countries who raise their standards above the norm are said to adopt a “protectionist†strategy. By including this provision, NAFTA realizes that “some legitimate environmental policies will have impacts on trade but should still be permitted.†[37] Finally, and most importantly, NAFTA addresses the “race to the bottom†concern with a provision that, as noted earlier, calls for “consultations†with the involved parties in order to discourage the practice. This provision was brought under the most scrutiny of any, mainly due to the fact that there were no enforceable trade penalties associated with the consultations. The provision, however, carries more influence than one might think on first read. In the words of one analyst, the drafters of this provision “concluded that none of the NAFTA Parties could withstand the public pressure likely to be generated by awareness of any environmental performance lapse revealed in consultations.†[38] In this manner, NGOs provide an informal compliance and monitoring commission for NAFTA and would presumably incite media frenzy if any country were to violate this provision. These substantive advancements, coupled with the creation of procedural enforcement institutions, illustrate the fact that there was greater discussion and consideration of environmental concerns in NAFTA law and its accompanying implementation mechanisms than most environmentalists ever could have dreamed for. For the first time in a major trade negotiation, the environmental lobbyâ€TMs arguments had been taken seriously and their efforts showed in the final agreement.
Fifteen years have passed since serious talks of a North American Free Trade Agreement began, and ten years have passed since the Agreement went into effect. What changes, then, have occurred in environmental regulation or conditions due to either the prospect or implementation of NAFTA? Many important changes, both for better and for worse, can be attributed to the treaty. These effects fall into two broad categories — changes caused by the prospect and subsequent discussion of the Agreement, and changes caused by the actual implementation of the substantive and procedural aspects of the agreement.
Significant change in Mexican environmental performance could already be seen by the time NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 1994. Before talks began in 1990, “Mexicoâ€TMs environment was deteriorating.†[39] When Presidents Salinas and Bush met in June 1990 for preliminary talks over NAFTA, however, “Mexicoâ€TMs environment, particularly along the Mexico-U.S. border, came under public scrutiny.†[40] Once NAFTA negotiations began, “parallel†talks that were meant to link trade and the environment also started. Almost immediately, the EPA and SEDUE intensified their efforts to “improve all dimensions of enforcement.†[41] From 1989 to 1992, the SEDUE budget increased from $4.3 million to $66.8 million and the number of inspection and enforcement personnel increased from 81 to 250 [42]. New governmental institutions were created in Mexico, many of which were modeled after the United Statesâ€TM EPA. These changes increased “the visibility and authority of environmental regulations,†separated rulemaking and permitting from enforcement, and created responsibilities to “close plants that were found in violation of the regulations†and seriously investigate citizenâ€TMs complaints about polluting facilities [43]. Inspections and closures of factories, not only in the maquiladorazone, were dramatically increased. In Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, all of which are cities far beyond the U.S.-Mexico border, the number of inspections increased from 1,509 in 1992 to 13,399 in the following 18 months [44]. In Mexico City, there was a 90% reduction in lead in the atmosphere and a 70% reduction in sulfur dioxide between June 1992 and August 1994 [45]. In the maquiladorazone, inspections increased by nearly ten times between June 1992 and June 1993 [46]. Interestingly, factories within the border zone turned out to be more compliant than factories far from it [47]. This suggests that American firms who move their operations to the Mexican maquiladorazone have an outside incentive to maintain their own environmental standards above those of “normal†Mexican factories, a clear argument against the alleged “race to the bottom†phenomenon. In any case, Husted and Logsdon provide the following analysis of the environmental improvements that occurred in the early 1990s in Mexico:
NAFTA brought the promise of higher GDP with which to provide resources for environmental protection and clean-up. Without NAFTA on the drawing board, it is unlikely that the Salinas administration would have been able to negotiate for World Bank funds in order to increase enforcement. It is also unlikely that the U.S. and Mexican governments would have negotiated the Integrated Border Environmental Plan to provide $589 million for border infrastructure and other environmental projects [48] .
Major improvements in Mexican environmental quality, in other words, can be directly attributed to the first-ever integration of environmental concerns into negotiations involving a major international free trade treaty.
While it is clear that between the period of 1990-1994 regulation, enforcement and industrial environmental quality in Mexico were on the rise, the results since 1994 have been more mixed. Industrial firms have indeed been drawn to Mexico — since 1994, the number of maquiladoras has doubled [49]. The environmental harm this has done, however, is much more highly associated with the growth in economic activity caused by freer trade than it is with any of the environmentalistâ€TMs four original fears about the treaty — lack of regulation, lowering of environmental standards, a “race to the bottom,†or extreme environmental damage in the border region. Instead, the main environmental problems have become those of water supplies, rubbish disposal, and sewage treatment [50] (although this last problem was greatly mitigated by the emphasis that SEDUE placed on construction of wastewater treatment plants). Two very encouraging facts, however, have arisen and remained since NAFTAâ€TMs implementation in 1994. First, there has been a rapid rise in non-governmental organizations, [51] a strong indicator of both increased institutional capacity and overall accountability, necessities of long-term environmental improvement. Secondly, a major test confronted Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo with the collapse of the peso in 1994. There was question of whether or not Mexicoâ€TMs interest in the environment would “dissipate with serious domestic economic pressures.†[52] As it turned out, the 1995 budget for SEDUE actually increased about 48% over its 1994 allocations [53] in the face of this crisis. With this result, Mexicoâ€TMs commitment to environmental protection was affirmed [54]. While Mexico certainly has important growth-related environmental issues on its plate, NAFTA has created important long-term improvements in public attitudes towards, institutional capacities in support of, and financial resources for Mexican environmental improvement.
NAFTA has been and will certainly continue to be closely scrutinized by future drafters of free-trade treaties. This is as it should be, since we can learn a lot from the precedent NAFTA has set. We can learn, for example, that fears like those of Ralph Nader and other activists have not come to fruition. For instance, no “multinational corporations,†to revisit one activistâ€TMs complaint, “are using trade rules to advance narrow commercial interests by challenging societyâ€TMs efforts to protect the environment…†There are many strong forces working against this “race to the bottom†issue. For starters, average pollution abatement costs for most industries are under 1% of total operating costs [55]. This, coupled with the harsh NGO scrutiny and brand-name tainting to which any industrial firm moving to Mexico would be subjected, are large deterrents for any firm considering a move to Mexico solely in order to take advantage of a perceived freedom from regulation.
We can also learn that the prospect of a free trade agreement can put a countryâ€TMs environmental practices under strong international scrutiny, as occurred in Mexico, creating a means to kick-start environmental regulatory programs. The take-home message of the NAFTA debate, however, is that representatives of the environmental lobby need to play a significant role in any future international trade negotiations. While some anti-trade arguments can reach the point of absurdity, it is important to note that without a surprisingly assertive push for environmental representation, the Border Plan, recognition in the NAFTA document itself, greater governmental transparency, increased institutional capacity, better infrastructure in the maquiladorazone, and more funding for environmental programs never would have been part of the NAFTA equation. As can be seen by the results of NAFTA, smartly negotiated international trade agreements can in fact increase overall economic prosperity while reducing the environmental footprint of all parties involved. Instead of harboring mutual distrust, free-traders and environmentalists can now look back with pride on the treaty they negotiated, together.
P.S.
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting 2005 of the WSC-SD in March 2005 at MIT, Cambridge, USA
Footnotes
[1] Ralph Nader, “Free Trade and the Decline of Democracy,†The Case Against “Free Trade†, (San Francisco, CA: Earth Island Press) 1.
[2] Ralph Nader, “Free Trade and the Decline of Democracy,†The Case Against “Free Trade†, (San Francisco, CA: Earth Island Press) 5
[3] Stephen Porter, Environment Groups Organize Against NAFTA Rules, 2000, Third World Network, 20 Apr. 2003, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/naf…
[4] John Audley, “Why Environmentalists Are Angry about the North American Free Trade Agreement,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 198.
[5] NAFTA Secretariat, North American Free Trade Agreement (Washington D.C.: 1992) Preamble.
[6] Daniel Esty, “Integrating Trade and Environment Policy Making: First Steps in the North American Free Trade Agreement,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 45.
[7] Daniel C. Esty, “Economic Integration and the Environment,†The Global Environment], ed. Norman J. Vig, et al. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999) 190.
[8] Daniel Esty, “Integrating Trade and Environment Policy Making: First Steps in the North American Free Trade Agreement,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 47.
[9] Daniel Esty, “Integrating Trade and Environment Policy Making: First Steps in the North American Free Trade Agreement,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 47.
[10] Four points adapted from Peter Uimonen and John Whalley, Environmental Issues in the New World Trading System (New York, NY: St. Martenâ€TMs Press, Inc., 1997) 134.
[11] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 295.
[12] Peter Uimonen and John Whalley, Environmental Issues in the New World Trading System (New York, NY: St. Martenâ€TMs Press, Inc., 1997) 134.
[13] Peter Uimonen and John Whalley, Environmental Issues in the New World Trading System (New York, NY: St. Martenâ€TMs Press, Inc., 1997) 134.
[14] Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, North American Free Trade: Issues and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992) 132.
[15] Ross Perot, 1993 Presidential Debate; text provided at http://www.michigan.edu/debate
[16] Daniel Esty, “Integrating Trade and Environment Policy Making: First Steps in the North American Free Trade Agreement,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 53.
[17] Peter Uimonen and John Whalley, Environmental Issues in the New World Trading System (New York, NY: St. Martenâ€TMs Press, Inc., 1997) 136.
[18] Daniel C. Esty, “Economic Integration and the Environment,†The Global Environment, ed. Norman J. Vig, et al. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999) 194.
[19] Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, North American Free Trade: Issues and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992) 132.
[20] Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, North American Free Trade: Issues and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992) 134.
[21] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 297.
[22] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 297.
[23] Senator Max Baucus, “Environmental Policy and Trade Agreements: The New Nexus,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 260.
[24] Environmental Protection Agency, Budget, http://www.epa.gov/ocfo
[25] Daniel C. Esty, “Economic Integration and the Environment,†The Global Environment, ed. Norman J. Vig, et al. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999) 197.
[26] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 301.
[27] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 301.
[28] Daniel Esty, “Integrating Trade and Environment Policy Making: First Steps in the North American Free Trade Agreement,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 49.
[29] Daniel C. Esty, “Economic Integration and the Environment,†The Global Environment, ed. Norman J. Vig, et al. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999) 197.
[30] Daniel Esty, “Integrating Trade and Environment Policy Making: First Steps in the North American Free Trade Agreement,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 49.
[31] Anonymous correspondent, “A greener, or browner, Mexico?†The Economist (Aug. 5th 1999).
[32] Daniel C. Esty, “Economic Integration and the Environment,†The Global Environment, ed. Norman J. Vig, et al. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999) 197.
[33] Daniel C. Esty, “Economic Integration and the Environment,†The Global Environment, ed. Norman J. Vig, et al. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999) 197.
[34] NAFTA Secretariat, North American Free Trade Agreement (Washington D.C.: 1992) Preamble.
[35] NAFTA Secretariat, North American Free Trade Agreement (Washington D.C.: 1992) Chapter 2.
[36] Peter Uimonen and John Whalley, Environmental Issues in the New World Trading System (New York, NY: St. Martenâ€TMs Press, Inc., 1997) 139.
[37] Daniel C. Esty, “Economic Integration and the Environment,†The Global Environment, ed. Norman J. Vig, et al. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999) 198.
[38] Daniel Esty, “Integrating Trade and Environment Policy Making: First Steps in the North American Free Trade Agreement,†Trade and the Environment, ed. Durwood Zaelke, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 53.
[39] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 293.
[40] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 297.
[41] Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, North American Free Trade: Issues and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992) 136.
[42] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 297.
[43] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 297.
[44] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 299.
[45] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 300.
[46] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 301.
[47] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 301.
[48] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 302.
[49] Anonymous correspondent, “A greener, or browner, Mexico?†The Economist (Aug. 5th 1999).
[50] Anonymous correspondent, “A greener, or browner, Mexico?†The Economist (Aug. 5th 1999).
[51] Anonymous correspondent, “A greener, or browner, Mexico?†The Economist (Aug. 5th 1999).
[52] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 303.
[53] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact ofNAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 303.
[54] Bryan W. Husted and Jeanne M. Logsdon, “The Impact of NAFTA on Mexicoâ€TMs Environmental Policy,†The Economics of International Trade and the Environment, ed. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, et al. (Danvers, MA: CRC Press, 2001) 303.
[55] Peter Uimonen and John Whalley, Environmental Issues in the New World Trading System (New York, NY: St. Martenâ€TMs Press, Inc., 1997) 135.
Fri, Dec 23, 2005
Vision Journal